During the funerary ceremonies of the Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, his son, prime-minister Lee Hsien Loong remembered the audience that his father, “Minister Mentor”, warned him that “Even if you are going to lower me into the grave and I feel something is going wrong, I will get up” (The Economist, 2015a, p. 48). The influence of the outgoing leader is not rare even when not affirmed so explicitly. Three examples show various nuances of this process. As a first illustration, the memory of Steve Jobs is carefully kept at Apple. As reported in the *Fast Company* magazine, the plaque with Steve Jobs’ name is still in its place. Tim Cook, Jobs’ successor explains the situation as follows: “His name should be on the door. That’s just the way it should be. That’s what felt right to me” (Schlender & Tetzeli, 2015, p.88).

Jobs passed away in 2011, yet his charismatic force endures to the present day, and it expresses a symbolic presence over the current leader. Second, as ex-CEO Jack Welch commented negatively about the performance of his successor Jeffrey Immelt, in the pages of the *BusinessWeek* magazine in 2008. This suggests that former leaders can still project influence over their successors in a more than symbolic mode. Finally, the case that constitutes the focal attention in this paper, the former President of Colombia and currently a Senator, Álvaro Uribe, maintained a very intense flow of adverse comments about his successor and former cabinet member Juan Manuel Santos.
These examples clearly show that past and present leaders frequently maintain a mutually influencing relationship, which has received surprisingly little attention from the leadership scholarly literature. This type of exchange is rooted on a set of power interactions that are likely to affect leaders’ behaviors and decisions, which are worth analyzing and understanding.

With this paper we contribute to the filling of this gap. We define leader-leader exchange (henceforth LLX) as dyadic reciprocal influences between two people whose identity in the relationship is one of a leader. This covers several forms of leader-leader relations: founder and CEO, chief and former chief, chairman and CEO, and leader and leader in dual leadership. Here we study the case of the Colombian presidential dyad formed by President Santos and former President Uribe. As Tse and Ashkanasy (2015, p. inicial) recently pointed out, “our understanding of dyadic relationships at work remains underdeveloped”. Their plea, however, seems to disregard or obliterate the leader-leader relationship which, as seen, may play an important role in modern organizations. Hence, our goal is to elucidate the dyadic dynamics involving leaders, formal and actual, using a current case of the Colombian political regime. From a theoretical perspective, the case offers an opportunity to study the process of LLX and to invite the academic community to explore the role of previous leaders on the actions of current leaders. From both a theoretical and
managerial perspective, this study defends that the influence of former leaders is much more important than is usually portrayed in the literature.

With the above purpose we designed the paper around the sections described next. We start by making the case for need of scholarly theorizing the leader-leader exchange. This defense is based on the observation that, in some cases, the influence of former leaders is active even after their departure. In this initial section, we theorize the need to extend relational leadership theories to the case of interactions between leaders. Next we explain how we address the topic empirically. We fundamentally combine two methods: the life story, which due to space limitations we use with parsimony to introduce our two main political agents - the president of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos and his predecessor Álvaro Uribe Vélez - and the critical incident technique. The incidents that we selected were used to develop a narrative analysis of the exchanges between these central actors of today’s Colombian political scene. We then present the core findings and discuss their implications for the understanding of inter-leader exchange. Overall, our work suggests that in real life settings the exit of one leader and the entry of another one form a complex net of processes and interactions, and not just a transitional routine, an unproblematic moment, as assumed in the literature. We conclude that the relationships among powerful actors, such as those under
observation, can be characterized by prolonged interdependence when the departing leader does not leave the stage, intense emotionality whose signal can change, and shifting roles, as the actors rearrange their role and participation in the relationship. We next start with a brief theoretical introduction to leader-leader dyadic relationships.

**Towards leader-leader, dyadic exchanges**

The literature on leadership has recently shifted its attention from an entity-base view, which focuses on leaders as individuals with specific attributes that define the nature of their action and influence, towards an understanding of leadership as a process that is fundamentally relational, socially-constructed and dynamic (Uhl-Bien, 2006). As Tourish (2014, p.87) explained “Leadership is less one person doing something to another (with their more or less willing compliance). Rather, it is a process whereby leaders and non-leaders accomplish each other through dynamics of interaction in which influence is always present.” In the same vein, Petriglieri and Petriglieri (2015) denote leadership as a process that is dynamic, ongoing and relational. More than the individuals themselves, what matters and what constitutes the unit of analysis from a relational perspective, is the “space between” individuals (Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000), meaning the mutual construction of leadership at the interface of individual agency, institutional influence, and socio-material conditions. The relational focus resulted in important conceptual advancements including the
well-known LMX (leader-member exchange) theory, which approaches leadership as a relational process involving leaders and followers. In this theory, leadership is relationality and the quality of relations defines the effectiveness of leaders (Martin, Guillaume, Thomas, Lee & Epitropaki, 2015).

Another important theoretical innovation of relational leadership is that, over time, relationships inevitably change (Uhl-Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007). In fact, process is about change (Tsoukas, 2005), and change is process. Changes in relationships can follow a positive path, a negative one, or a mixed one. From an optimistic stance, it is assumed that relationships improve over time as leaders gain idiosyncratic credits (Hollander, 1958) and trust grows between leaders and followers (Klaussner, 2012). But as the case described in this text shows, over time, relationships may deteriorate, idiosyncratic credits may be lost, dialogues may become unproductive, and parallel conversations can take place without the creation of a common ground (Tsoukas, 2009). Trust breaches. As a result, forms of collaboration may become competitive and former allies may misalign.

The above mentioned topics have been mostly studied with the guiding assumption that leadership relationships involve leaders and followers. In this paper we extend the relational perspective, in general, and the LMX model, in particular, into a new, underexplored direction,
assuming that relational leadership may involve current leaders and former leaders. The topic is important because, as discussed above, the former leader often influences in a real and/or an imagined/symbolic way, the new leader. Next, we discuss three processes that help explain the influence of the former leader over the action of the new leader: succession dynamics, implicit leadership theories, and collective memory.

**Succession dynamics.** The relationship between former leader and new leader has been dominated in the leadership literature by the theme of leadership succession (e.g., Giambatista, Rowe & Riaz, 2005). Succession is an important moment in the life of organizations and institutions, with research showing, for example, that in the case of young business firms succession increases mortality (Haveman, 1993). Succession is an important topic because it opens a period of liminality (Turner, 1969) which places organizations between the legacy of the former leader and the unproven credibility of new leader. Because some leaders, such as Uribe, are reluctant to leaving power (The Economist, 2015b), during transitions, new leaders coexist with the legacy and the influence of previous leaders. This influence manifests in multiple ways. First, organizations are inertial, which means that new leaders have to build their leadership over the leadership of their predecessors. As noted by Lanzara (1998), institutional work is necessarily built over the existing institutions and previous leaders still
influence the functioning of the organizations they left. Second, comparisons are inevitable. New leaders construct their leadership identities, their personal “mark”, over and around the identity of the former leader. Third, incoming leaders have to gain their legitimacy as leaders. Formal power is only one power base and the formal position is one the very beginning of a process of constructing or failing to build legitimacy (Watkins, 2003). The way transition is managed can project positive or negative effects. The coaching and preparation of next leader generation can make the process smooth but it can also build up rivalries. The process is transparently visible in family-owned firms due to family dynamics, but it can be less apparent in other contexts, such as business and political leadership (Parker, Kram & Hall, 2013).

**Implicit leadership theories.** An often ignored aspect of the leadership experience is the fact that a new leader does not initiate leadership over a blank slate. Over time, organizational members develop their own implicit theories of leadership (Detert & Edmondson, 2011). Leaders learn vicariously about leadership by observing other leaders in action. It can thus be said that one’s implicit leadership theories are shaped by experiences with previous leaders. Vicariously, one learns what to emulate, what to avoid, and how to relate to leaders. The process through which leaders construct their leadership theories through contact with previous leaders is well-known. Leaders are prepared via several methods to assume leadership and, in this
sense, leaders learn leadership by observing more senior leaders in action. Hence, previous leadership experience (interactions) of the new leader with the former will possibly make an important contribution to the understanding of leader action.

**Emotional climates.** A third relevant process for explaining LLX is collective and organizational memory. The topic of organizational memory has received important theoretical attention (Moorman & Miner, 1998,) but it has mostly been analyzed from a cognitive perspective. Collective systems also have emotional memories (Vuori & Huy, forthcoming), an idea expressed in the notion of emotional climates (Páez, Espinosa & Bobowik, 2013). Memories of previous leaders may produce organizational nostalgia (Gabriel, 1993; Orr, 2014). In this case, the organization nurtures an image of the foregone leader that is not necessarily real and that can be romanticized, which then helps to perpetuate a positive representation of influential past leaders. Over time, leaders may gain some characteristics and lose others, and in the process, sometimes, they acquire superhuman charismatic qualities of “great men” (Spector, 2015). This overly positive memory of a departing leader can be problematic for the incoming leader, as it will give rise to comparisons, excessive expectations and other biases (e.g., contrast effect) that may prevent the new incumbent to affirm his/her style. In other cases, the departure of a failing leader may be a source of hope and organizational
revitalization (Luthans, Youssef & Avolio, 2006). In sum, the succession process is necessarily more than a mere replacement; it is a complex array of formal and informal procedures that involve not only rational and logical decisions, but also emotional and power-related interactions.

**Dyadic, leader-leader relationships**

Dyads refer to “one-on-one relationships” (Tse & Ashkanasy, 2015, p. inicial). They constitute an important level of organizational analysis as people routinely engage in dyadic forms of interaction. Dyads constitute a preferential locus to study leader-leader relationships. The three processes outlined in the previous section acquire specific meanings when approached from a dyadic perspective. First, succession, especially at the top level, constitutes a potentially painful experience for both the outgoing leader as well as for the incoming one. In some cases, the transition is run smoothly and collaboratively (Mulcahy, 2010), but in other cases transitions are rough and not free of visible or less visible struggles. As expressed in the opening anecdotes, some leaders wish to project influence even after they are formally gone. Second, as the new leader starts to differentiate him/herself from the previous leader, this may be perceived as an attack to the leader or to the legacy left, creating friction and psychological conflict (Kets de Vries, 1995). Finally, new leaders are not left with an institutional blank page upon which they can inscribe their
leadership at will – leadership is best viewed as written over institutional palimpsests with previous inscriptions influencing possible new inscriptions (Cunha, Clegg, Rego & Silva, 2015). In this sense, their actions will either reinforce or destabilize the existing institutional framework.

Transitions initiate leader-leader exchanges that contain risk. If the leader follows its predecessor’s vision he/she may be accused of being a passive follower of the previous leader, therefore lacking leadership. If he/she decides to change, he/she may be also criticized on the grounds that strategic instability is negative, that change is a result of insecurity, narcissism, hubris and so on. Such is the paradox of leader succession: continuity may be perceived as lack of leadership; discontinuity may be interpreted as hubris. For the above reasons, leader-leader interactions are both important and surprisingly understudied.

In order to study the complexity and nuance of dyadic leader-leader exchanges, we focus on the case of the Colombian Presidential dyad composed by Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Juan Manuel Santos. Uribe presided the country between 2002 and 2010 (inaugurating the presidential re-election modality), and Santos was first elected in 2010 and reelected in 2014. Santos was running his second presidential mandate (2014-2018) while this article was written. Hence, the paper
accompanies an open-ended, evolving situation. Given our goal and the conceptual aims of the study, this does not constitute a problem as, in line with relational leadership theory (see e.g. Uhl-Bien, 2006), we were not interested in the effectiveness of any of those leaders and the political implications of their action, but rather in the relationship itself. We approach our topic from a relational perspective, meaning that we are more interested in the “space between” these two men than in their persons as individuals. We provide a biographical outline of both Uribe and Santos but we are less interested in them as “entities”, than in their evolving relationship.

Several reasons accounted for our interest for this case. First, our personal interest, raised by familiarity with the case (e.g., Kets de Vries; 2001). Second, we were able to compose an insider/outsider team (Bartunek & Louis, 1996), an important condition to assure that our interpretations were not biased by both a liability of foreignness or by the personal political preferences and biases that can result from proximity of the case. We trust that this allowed us to construct a rich empirical analysis and a plausible conceptual interpretation with minimized preference bias. Third, because the case provides a revelatory expression of the topic under analysis which makes particularly adequate as a case. Additionally, because of its public nature, the sources we used are easy to track. We used bibliographies or auto-biographies (Hernández, 2014; Uribe, 2012) as well as a book
specifically dedicated to their relationship (*Enemigos*, “Enemies”, by the journalist Vicky Dávila, 2014), digital media and published sources. All these elements are public which means that other researchers can use the same or other sources to continue or to contest our interpretations.

**Method**

Firsthand experience of the members of the research team with Colombia and its political scene attracted our theoretical imagination, which means that we approached the case as an ongoing, open-ended process, with an academic interest, and no political preferences or no need for caveats. The composition of an insider/outsider team, mentioned above, stimulated us to pursue this project. Before progressing, it is important to clarify that as academic researchers we do not take sides in the process. We analyze the case with conceptual interests exclusively.

The case was conceptually stimulating, because it rendered transparently clear the importance of the exchanges between previous and current leaders. In this sense the case can be thought of as an extreme case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006). By “extreme” we do not mean that the case is rare but rather that it presents a phenomenon of interest in a more transparent way than
tends to happen in other, more ordinary occasions. What renders the case conceptually transparent is the fact that the processes studied here have not taken place behind the scenes, being instead public and notorious, with significant media reporting.

We inductively use a combination of the life story method (Musson, 1998) and the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954). The life story consists of the narrative analysis of leaders’ lives in a holistic way. Amongst the most relevant information sources we used biography, here defined as “all forms of life-stories, not only written or published biographies” (Shamir et al. 2005, p.14) and other textual forms, namely media and digital information on the cases of Colombian politics in general, and the Uribe/Santos dyad, in particular. As Shamir, Dayan-Horesh and Adler (2010, p.16) pointed out, “leaders’ biographies are an important missing link in leadership research because biographies produce leaders, and leaders, being at least partially aware of that, produce biographies, and both processes are important to the development of a leadership relationship”. The selected critical episodes allowed us to identify defining moments in the relationship. Episodes provide partial and incomplete accounts of reality, however they offer a parsimonious and conceptually revelatory window of observation over a complex personal and political relationship. Critical incidents are extreme moments but their extremity can be conceptually illuminating. This combination of
sources allowed us to explore the communicative side of the relationship, i.e. the part of the relationship that was transmitted to the general public. This is aligned with relational leadership theory ethos: as Dachler (1992) pointed out, relationships are inherently communicative (p.173), produced and heard by others in contexts created by a multitude of voices (Kornberger, Clegg & Carter, 2006), and embedded in complex relational networks.

With the previously mentioned sources, we sorted five incidents that critically (Flanagan, 1954) help to explain the complexities of the Uribe-Santos relationship. The incidents were discussed among the members of the research team. They have been selected because they are public, relevant and define the nature of the relationship. A relationship is an ongoing accomplishment and, in this sense, the events are episodes, limited in duration and which do not capture the texture and complexity of the relationship. But the impact of some events is long lasting (Deroy & Clegg, 2011). Events, in this sense, crystalize visible, relevant occurrences with significant process impact. The events selected are the following: (1) the election of Santos, a former minister of Uribe’s cabinet; (2) the public announcement, by President Santos, of the existence of peace negotiations with the FARC guerillas; (3) the reelection of President Santos in 2014, against a candidate supported by Uribe’s Centro Democrático party; (4) the election of Uribe as Senator for the Centro Democrático party in 2014;
and (5) the shooting by the FARC of 11 soldiers in Cauca in April 2015 and the deliberate oil spill by the FARC in June 2015, that the magazine Semana qualified as a moment of truth (REF). Other events could have been selected, but these illustrate critical relational moments, namely divergence, indirect confrontation, and finally direct opposition.

To enrich the understanding of the episodes we prepare the discussion by sketching the two men’s life stories, in a necessarily brief fashion.

**Sketches of life: Uribe and Santos**

It is beyond the scope of the chapter to present detailed life stories of the two protagonists of the case. In this sense we offer a glimpse of the stories of the two politicians in order to contextualize their presidential actions (see appendixes 1 and 2 for further details).

Álvaro Uribe Veléz served as president of Colombia from 2002 to 2010. He was born in Medellin in 1952 and sees himself as one “country man”. His love for horses and horse riding is well known, and his family owned important granaries in the department of Antioquia. He received his education mostly in Colombia and started his political life as mayor of Medellin in 1982. His father was a victim of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which raised psychoanalytical explanations of his hard approach to the terrorist group. As president he conquered
high levels of political approval, in part because of the success against the FARC. Being a hardliner he benefitted from the help of the US government under the aegis of the so-called Plan Colombia. At the end of this term the State did reassumed control of most of the country, and the infamous drug cartels were severely damaged. He was elected and reelected, with the reelection implying a constitutional amendment. Further amendments to pass the possibility of a second reelection were not approved and he finished his final mandate with a very high approval rate as the most charismatic politician of contemporary Colombia. In fact, in 2014 he was elected as senator.

Juan Manuel Santos corresponds to the popular depiction of a natural born politician. He was born in the capital city of Colombia, Bogotá, in 1951, in a powerful family. His grandfather Eduardo Santos Montejo, served as president between 1938 and 1942, and his family had the majority participation of the influential El Tiempo newspaper until 2007. Juan Manuel Santos studied in the United Kingdom and the US and served as minister of foreign trade between 1991 and 1993, minister of finance (2000-2004), and minister of defense (2006-2009) before being elected president in 2010. As minister, he served in Uribe’s governments and gained public notoriety with the famous Operation Jaque, which resulted in the liberation of 15 hostages from the FARC, including the former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. As a minister of defense he gained the reputation of a
hawk and his hard stance against the FARC contributed to his political clout. As will be examined below, once in office, he adopted a “smart power” approach (Nye, 2008), combining military action with openness to a negotiated solution. As will be discussed next, Uribe became Santos’ main political opponent.

Given their common political histories and their contrasting regional backgrounds, when Santos became president the relationship was already formed. Until Santos assumed the presidency the relationships between these two men could be described by the LMX perspective. From then on, however, the relationship evolved: one was now president and the other a former president, the former chief of the new president, and a still very influential politician in the Colombian scene that seemed to retain a leader identity. All these reasons suggest the appropriateness of the case, in order to explore leader-leader exchanges. In this view, people who identify themselves as leaders maintain forms of interdependence that influence one another’s action, in a leadership dyadic movement that takes place over time. To explore the dynamic nature of leader-leader interactions in a comprehensive but efficient way, we use the critical incident approach to narratively organize the relationship around five episodes that describe the space between two entities, and which, in our view, can be considered defining moments in the relationship.
Analyzing the critical incidents

The case of the Uribe/Santos relationship suggests that dyadic relationships change over time, as predicted by Tse and Ashkanasy (2015). We organize our findings narratively, around a sequence of critical incidents. The incidents are defining moments in the relationship between the two politicians in the sense that they implied qualitative changes in the relationship. Their unfolding illustrates the changing nature of the relationship, as well as the importance of deep personal bonds in organizational and institutional settings.

Incident 1: Santos election (moving from alignment to misalignment). The first incident is indicative of alignment. Santos being a former cabinet member of Uribe, the two men could in principle be represented as political allies as well as bearers of compatible ideological positions. The selected quotes suggest cordiality at the political and personal levels. Santos pays homage to Uribe as the best President that Colombia has had. He adds that his intention is to protect the “immense” legacy of Uribe, his achievements and his proposals. They shared the same political platform, Partido de la U.

The good auspices were rapidly perturbed when Santos invited the Venezuelan Bolivarian president Hugo Chávez to attend his investiture ceremony. Chávez and Uribe had developed a very tense political
relationship and Santos’ invitation was not well received by Uribe. In addition to the invitation Santos develop a cordial relationship with Chávez. He even called him his “new best friend”. This was received by the Uribist group as treason (Hernández, 2014). This representation was based on a trio of arguments: Santos betrayed Uribe’s policy of “democratic security”; he betrayed him with the peace negotiation; and he betrayed him with his cordial relationship with Chávez. This new diplomatic approach signaled a marked departure from Uribe’s policy since the very first moment. This divergence would be aggravated by the peace process to be initiated with the FARC.

Incident 2: The peace process (moving from light to deep divergence). The political honeymoon was brief. As soon as Santos’ plans regarding a peace process became known, the political divergence became evident. Politically, the peace process marked a deviation from Uribe’s policies. According to analysts, Uribe may have perceived this development as political and personal breach of trust. Álvaro Uribe, referring to Juan Manuel Santos, defended that “He is handing the country to terrorists”. Santos, in turn, asked the opposition to stop sabotaging the peace process. Santos claimed that he and Uribe envisioned the same ends via different means but this did not appeased Uribe and the Uribistas.
The peace negotiations with the FARC constituted a radical departure from Uribe’s policies. Uribe adopted a hard line whereas Santos reversed this, adopting instead a softer approach (Nye, 2008). The negotiations started secretly in Havana and when publicly assumed, established a clear departure from the orientation of the previous polity. The initial alignment gave way to clear and public disagreement, and a progressive distancing from consensus.

**Incident 3: Rupture (moving from contest and conflict, to opposition and hostility).** Once the peace process was set in motion the political rupture between the two men became clear. The 2014 presidential election formalized the divide. Santos’ main competitor was Óscar Iván Zuluaga, supported by the Centro Democrático, the political party of Álvaro Uribe Vélez. Zuluaga presented himself as the guardian of the values of Uribe, and Santos was now in the opposite camp. The political rupture was thus formalized electorally. Santos was now competing against Uribe. Uribe accused Santos of political abuse: “Colombia needs a different electoral system that guarantees transparency and prevents abuses such as those committed by Santos’ government”, he said. Critics, however, noted that he participated himself in attempts to additional constitutional amendments. Santos, in contrast, defended that the problematic relationship was due to his personal independence from Uribe: "He wanted me to be his puppet. Since the first day he has begun to attack me viscerally. He has not
stopped attacking me for one day. He says I'm going to die, he calls me traitor, liar, scoundrel. Why? Just because I was not his puppet."

**Incident 4: Uribe is elected senator (from low-scale to open and full-scale opposition).** This rupture turned to direct, formal, and personal opposition when in 2015 Uribe was elected senator. He explained his motivations in his first speech:

> “Four years ago, in the midst of a collective expression of confidence and optimism, we elected the current government; we are here to answer and amend the deteriorating security, [...] the lack of Government to listen to the social and productive sectors.”

His explanation was based on political arguments and a sense of personal responsibility for the jeopardizing of his legacy. Detractors reacted with more personal, emotional arguments: “I want to congratulate senator Uribe and his group that had a dignified second place. I hope we can leave the hatred, the resentments behind and work for the country.” What is central in this incident is the fact that for the first time since Uribe left the presidency, he and Santos were formal direct parliamentary opponents. Opposition was no longer mediated as in the 2014 election, and Uribe was no longer a retired president but an active member of the senate.
**Incident 5: FARC attacks (Enmity).** Álvaro Uribe used Twitter posts as a political media. He twitted abundantly and the tweets were very critical of the President. Here is one example "Santos, please don’t deceive us anymore, don’t justify the murder of our soldiers with the story of the 'war you want to end" (Noticias RCN, 2015). He presents Santos as a deceiver. In addition, Uribe takes advantage of all the FARC attacks to ask Santos to reframe the peace process and at the same time criticize this government. At this time the personal enmity between these two former allies was public. Political antagonism became personal. I guess this one still needs improvement?

**Discussion**

The case offers a nuanced view of an often ignored dimension of leadership: the leader-leader dyad. Our analysis indicates that the study of leadership, from a relational angle, could benefit from analyses attentive to time, interdependence, and emotion. With regards to time, the extant research on leadership and leadership succession is often based on short time frames (Giambatista et al., 2005). The case described in the current text shows that successions can be long-lasting processes that are best apprehended with a longitudinal view. Longitudinal studies may capture the evolution of relationships, which is important because relationships are necessarily evolving and dynamic (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996). Our case shows
that a relationship that, at its beginning, was thought be one of continuity, evolved over time to become one of overt hostility. This is important to introduce nuance and conceptual thickness to an area in which “smooth transition” is normally represented as positive (Giambatista et al., 2005). We problematize the simplicity of the smooth transition hypothesis and render salient the processual nature of relations and transitions: smoothness is potentially transitory and leadership relations are sometimes characterized by continued interdependence. This leads to a first theoretical proposition:

Proposition 1a: Leader-leader interactions may terminate with succession or fade in intensity; in this case their relevance will decrease over time.

Proposition 1b: Leader-leader interactions may not terminate with succession and rather remain operative; in this case their relevance will increase over time.

Second, the case reveals the role of interdependence over leader roles. The succession process is often approached as a substitution. When that is the case a new leader assumes the role and the former exits the scene. The case herein reveals that in reality succession processes may be more complicated than that. Sometimes leaders simply do not go. Leaders influence organizations in multiple ways and in some cases
their influence is still active even after they leave. As shown in the current case, their roles may shift. Uribe passed from previous president to informal opponent, to active opponent. This process of role shifting is not well typified in the literature. Its relevance, however, should be considered as a pertinent research proposal:

Proposition 2: If a LLX persists, leader roles may shift over time in the direction of more collaborative roles if the relation is positive (2a) or more antagonistic roles if the relation is negative (2b).

Third, our study rendered the role of emotions salient. It has shown that emotions are dynamic. Rivalries, alliances and enmities are human processes. They are dynamic and change over time, shaped by choices and the way they are interpreted. More needs to be known about how emotional and rational aspects interact over time. One of the most interesting findings of our inductive study is that, over time, political and emotional factors interacted and reinforced one another, creating a spiral of political divergence, confidence erosion, and emotional hostility that have grown over the period under scrutiny. The mutual influence between emotional and rational elements is an important factor that helps to understand the unfolding of leadership. As Kets de Vries (1995) has pointed out, the practice of leadership is shaped by a leader’s deep motives and inner psychological theatres. Our study
analyzes how emotional aspects may influence leadership relational expressions, showing that emotional intensity participates in political dyadic relationships as time goes by and emotional relationships evolve:

Proposition 3: Over time continued interdependence will influence the emotionality of the relationship, making it more intense and positive in case of collaboration (3a) and more intense and negative in case of rivalry (3b).

Reliability. In terms of the verisimilitude of the findings, composing an insider/outsider team and relying exclusively in public sources has important advantages. The research team composition, with members with differing degrees of familiarity with the case, potentially avoids undue bias do to political inclinations. The fact that we exclusively used public sources, makes the case open to scrutiny by other researchers. Readers and other investigators can easily complement our version with alternative incidents and complementary interpretations. In no way we defend that our interpretation represents the truth of the matter. We consider that our interpretation is plausible and that it offers conceptually relevant possibilities for advancing the study of LLX. Other incidents may proportionate distinct angles of observation obtained via the use of different events. The possible juxtaposition of interpretations may contribute to richer,
multidimensional forms of understanding the case, as well as the process of leader-leader exchange more broadly.

Implications for theory. We considered one revelatory case to extend relational leadership literature in the direction of LLX, highlighting the fact that relational nature of leadership is not confined to the leader-subordinate dyad. We focused on the case of leaders and their former leaders, a dyad that has received limited research consideration. Our results indicate that complex leader-leader exchange can be characterized by a combination of three characteristics. First, prolonged interdependence, as the former leader resists leaving the stage open to his/her successor. Second, relationships stimulated the shifting of roles. Former president Uribe became a senator, the first former president to play this role and the two previous collaborators became antagonists. Finally, intense emotionality as conflict over substantive issues may metamorphose into intense emotional antagonism. As predicted by existing work, substantive and personal conflicts are not always kept apart (Jehn, 1997), with Hernández (2014, p.195) defending that Uribe developed a personal hatred towards Santos, which was not reciprocated. When they are mixed, discord becomes personal animosity, the effects of which over the credibility of institutions deserve to be studied. In combination, these findings indicate that leader-leader exchanges are
richer in rational and emotional components, and therefore that they possibly deserve to be studied as a proper research topic in leadership theory.

The current neglect for leader-leader exchange is unfortunate as outgoing leaders leave a legacy that is not negligible. We thus invite leadership researchers to explore some possibilities opened by our emergent theorizing. These include but are not limited to questions such as: when and why do departing leaders remain active? How do allies become antagonists? What is the effect of public animosity between top leaders over the image and credibility of institutions? How do leaders use emotions and emotional work as a political tactic? The list could continue but these questions are indicative of the potential of a leader-leader exchange research agenda.

Implications for practice. The case shows that leader succession can be a complex process. In the literature, it is typically assumed as a simple episode, ideally one that unfolds rapidly and without major organizational disturbance. Our case suggests otherwise. Transition can be a long, nuanced, evolving process. It prompts a number of implications. First, the process of transition can be managed systemically. Expectations can be clarified. Roles can be defined with precision. Leaders can educate themselves and find senatorial coaches to help them deal with the process of stepping out. Institutions can
develop transition routines and processes that help leaders in the process of retirement. A press article recently pointed out that “Latin American politicians need to know when to retire” (The Economist, 2015, p.41). This knowledge is not only a matter of individual motivation but also an institutional issue not exclusive to Latin America. The case opens LLX research avenues for several organizational contexts including the political, but also those, for example, for family firms and other types of businesses where succession dynamics, chairman/CEO or founder/CEO relationships pose formidable psychological and governance challenges.

**Limitations and boundary conditions.** The findings obtained here cannot be generalized without caution. Relational leadership theory sees leadership as a process that is deeply embedded in context and contexts are unique. This is especially valid for presidential dyads. The nuances of the case may thus be hard to generalize. As noted by Uhl-Bien (2006, p. 666), “relational perspectives, which are dynamic approaches, are much harder to generalize” than fixed, entity-based perspectives.

The study’s boundaries are mostly defined by our research design and selection of case. Responding to Giambatista et al.’s (2005) call, we conducted a qualitative and inductive study which is why we do not consider it a weakness, despite the limitations it imposes. However,
some features of the case render its generalizability questionable. Political systems are more intricate and more deeply institutionalized than organizational systems (Cunha & Tsoukas, 2015). In this sense, some features of the case namely the coexistence of the two former presidents may not find an exact equivalence with business firms. Nevertheless, with the arrival of the celebrity CEO, some top executives maintain an active and visible activity, namely in the media, even after they leave an organization. Jack Welch’s criticisms to Jeffrey Immelt in the pages of *BusinessWeek*, are possibly not much different, in essence, from the case explored here.

The fact that we studied a political setting also matters. Politics have a logic that differs from that of business. The differences between the two settings are sufficiently important to be taken into account. In most political systems, the duration of mandates is constitutionally established, which means that leaders have to step out after finishing a mandate even if their approval rates are high and their action esteemed. This marks a crucial difference with the typical literature on leadership succession in organizational settings. But the differences should not distract us from the fact that important leadership contributions resulted, from the study of U.S. presidents (House, Spangler & Woycke, 1991). In addition to business and sports (Giambatista et al., 2005), politics may thus constitute a privileged setting to explore leader-leader exchanges.
Possibilities for future research. The study is an invitation for researchers to explore LLX. Theories of relational leadership have a significant potential. Future studies may explore how current leaders relate with their successors. They can prepare them with pride and a sense of responsibility and continuity, but as leadership in family-owned business shows, the process may be emotionally taxing with leaders feeling psychologically vulnerable (Levinson, 1971). Questions of identity, pride, personal worth, and role ambiguity, may be significantly enriched by considering succession and the relational unfolding it stimulates.

Conclusion

We invited management and organization researchers to complement the well-known leader-member exchange theory with a leader-leader exchange approach. This extension establishes that leaders are in contact not only with followers that mold their leadership, but also with other leaders, including their former bosses. Through the case of the Uribe-Santos relationship we found that the influence of the former leader does not necessarily fade as soon as a new leader is formally appointed. The study, in conclusion, addressed the complex nature of relationships between powerful leaders. Analyses of critical incidents involving Uribe and Santos after the latter’s election indicate that leader-leader exchanges can be more complicated than is predicted by
theories that assume that former leaders are rendered inactive after they step out of office. Reality can be more complex, as leader-leader relationships can be characterized by continued interdependence, shifting roles, and emotional intensification. Considering the nature of the exchange between leaders and followers is critical, but leaving other leaders out of examination renders an incomplete picture of the relational landscapes of leadership in organizational and institutional systems.
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http://www.elheraldo.co/nacional/tras-ataque-guerrillero-santos-ordena-levantar-suspension-de-bombardeos-las-farc-191506


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http://www.centrodemocratico.com/discurso-del-expresidente-y-senador-electo-por-el-centro-democratico-alvaro-uribe-velez


Appendix 1: Biographical notes of Presidents Uribe and Santos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Álvaro Uribe Vélez</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dates</strong></td>
<td><strong>Facts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Álvaro Uribe was born in Medellín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>He finished his doctoral degree in Law and Political Science at Universidad de Antioquia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>Director of Civil Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>Mayor of Medellín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1986</td>
<td>Councilman of Medellín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Obtained the certificate of Special Studies in Administration and Management at Harvard University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>Governor of Antioquia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The British Council gave him the Simón Bolívar scholarship and he was designated 'Senior Associate Member' of the Saint Antony's College at Oxford University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>President of Colombia (candidate of the movement Primero Colombia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>He founded the political party 'Partido de la U'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>Reelected as President of Colombia (candidate of 'Partido de la U').</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Uribe founded the political party 'Centro Democrático' with his ex-minister Oscar Iván Zuluaga, the senator Juan Carlos Vélez Uribe, the ex-ambassador Carlos Holmes Trujillo García, his ex-vice-president Francisco Santos Calderón and his ex-vice-minister of defense Rafael Guarín.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The Inte Group awarded him as the 'Best Latin American Political Leader of the Decade'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-Today</td>
<td>Senator of Colombia. He received the 'Best Senator' award in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-Today</td>
<td>Lecturer and professor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Juan Manuel Santos</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dates</strong></td>
<td><strong>Facts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Juan Manuel Santos was born in Bogotá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1981</td>
<td>Santos was the Chief Executive of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia to the International Coffee Organization in London, UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>He graduated with a bachelor degree in Economics and Business Administration at the University of Kansas, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Master of Science in Economic Development at London School</td>
</tr>
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</table>
of Economics, UK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Master in Public Administration at Harvard University, USA. He earned the Fulbright scholarship at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (USA) and also at Fundación Nieman at Harvard University, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Minister of foreign trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>Presidential Designate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>Director of the Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>Minister of Finance and Public Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Founded the political party: 'Partido de la U'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>President of Colombia (candidate of 'Partido de la U').</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Started the peace process with FARC guerrilla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-Hoy</td>
<td>Reelected as President of Colombia (candidate of 'Partido de la U').</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2: Brief description of the evolving relationships between the two leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Relationships - Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Uribe was Senator and Santos was the Minister of foreign trade. Both members of Liberal Party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>Uribe was Senator and Santos was the Presidential Designate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>Uribe was the Governor of Antioquia (he was part of the Liberal Party) and Santos was the Director of the Liberal Party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>Uribe was the President of Colombia and Santos was his Minister of Finance and Public Credit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Uribe and Santos founded the political party: 'Partido de la U'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Uribe was reelected as President of Colombia and Santos was his Minister of Defense.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Santos was the President of Colombia, as successor of Uribe.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;I receive these awards with pride and with great commitment to continue the path you drew to Colombia, in order to take our country to the destination port that you and I have in common&quot; Tells Juan Manuel Santos to Alvaro Uribe (El Tiempo, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Political divorce' between Santos and Uribe.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The political party 'Partido de la U' created during the first term of Alvaro Uribe to surround his government work, today aims to support the President Juan Manuel Santos, whose dispute with his predecessor seems irreconcilable&quot;(El Tiempo, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The government abandons the platform that chose and lies with bureaucratic excuses” Tweet from Alvaro Uribe talking about Juan Manuel Santos’ government (El País, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Uribe founded the political party 'Centro Democrático', the main opposition of the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Mr. President Santos, betrayal to the nation is a crime in which your government is failing because it allows the murder of soldiers and policemen and also gives impunity. That's betrayal to the nation.” (Álvaro Uribe, 2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The confrontation between the two leaders starts in the beginning of this government with the refusal of Santos to follow the guidelines of his predecessor” (El Tiempo, 2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-Hoy</td>
<td>Uribe is Senator and Santos was reelected as President of Colombia</td>
<td>“Many or few of us have an obligation to rebel against Santos’ deceit that has equaled the democracy and his soldiers with terrorism” (Twitter Alvaro Uribe, 2014)</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The base of the political party Centro Democrático, the political organization created by the ex-President Alvaro Uribe, prepared carefully in recent weeks its opposition strategy which will be based, in particular, in doing debates about political control and present legislative initiatives in the fronts on which it considers the government of Juan Manuel Santos has failed” (El Tiempo, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The Uribismo will use a media and political strategy to show the mistakes and weaknesses of the government of Juan Manuel Santos &quot; said Diego Cediel in 2014, professor of political sciences of Universidad de la Sabana. (El Tiempo, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table X

The critical incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Facts implied and conceptual relevance</th>
<th>Uribe’s messages</th>
<th>Santos’ messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santos elected as President</td>
<td>June 19th 2010: Juan Manuel Santos was elected president of Colombia with the 69% of the votes. With almost 9 million votes, a million and a half more than the ones obtained by Álvaro Uribe Vélez in 2006, Santos will govern Colombia for the next four years (La Silla Vacía, 2010). <strong>Conceptual relevance:</strong> this is the moment when a former subordinate assumes leadership. For our case, this moment triggers a leader-leader relationship</td>
<td>“I ask God for every success. My best regards to you and your family”, said the Colombian president Álvaro Uribe to his successor by telephone, as he wished “all light from God” to the new government. (América Economía, 2010)</td>
<td>“I want to thank the president Álvaro Uribe Vélez. The best president that Colombia has had. Mister president Uribe, this is your triumph and from all who want to protect your immense legacy. Colombia has voted preponderantly to defend your achievements and proposals. Here is your party, “el Partido de la U”, triumphant as always” (Juan Manuel Santos en Vivo Resultados de Elecciones Mayo 30 del 2010).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Peace negotiations | October 17th, 2012: Peace negotiations between the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government of Juan Manuel Santos begun at Havana, Cuba. | “The ex-president Uribe and his friends are interested in the failure of the negotiations. His strategy is simple: if they fail, Uribe will be successful” (Castillo, 2012). | “He asked the opposition to stop the “sabotage” to the peace process” Juan Manuel Santos referring to Álvaro Uribe (El País, 2014). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Conceptual relevance</th>
<th>Relevant Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 15th, 2014:</td>
<td>Juan Manuel Santos was reelected as the President of Colombia with the 50.93% of votes in the second round.</td>
<td><strong>Conceptual relevance:</strong> Santos is re-elected against the candidate supported by Uribe. Increased legitimacy for Santos to prosecute his own ideas.</td>
<td>&quot;Colombia needs a different electoral system that guarantees transparency and prevents abuses such as those committed by the Santos’ government” (Vanguardia, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9th, 2015:</td>
<td>The ex-president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, from the “Centro Democrático” party obtained the first curul in the Senate for 2014-2018 (Redacción ElHeraldo.co, 2014).</td>
<td>&quot;Four years ago, in the midst of a collective expression of confidence and optimism, we elected the current government; We are here to answer and amend the deteriorating security, [...] the lack of Government to listen to the social and political demand&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;I want to congratulate the senator Uribe and his group that had a dignified second place. I hope we can leave the hatred, the resentments behind and work for the country” (Redacción ElHeraldo.co, 2014).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Conceptual relevance:** Uribe’s opposition becomes formal and personal, non-mediated.

| FARC attacks | April 15th, 2015: eleven soldiers died after being ambushed by armed men dressed as civilians in the village of Buenos Aires, in the department of Cauca. The attack was attributed to the FARC’s “Miller Perdomo” mobile column (Noticias RCN, 2015). | Twitter post: "Santos, please don’t deceive us anymore, don’t justify the murder of our soldiers with the story of the ‘war you want to end’" (Noticias RCN, 2015). | Twitter post: “I’m sorry about the dead of soldiers in Cauca. This is exactly the war we want to end” (Noticias RCN, 2015). “I’ve given the order to the lift the bombing restrictions".

Uribe asked the National Government to make a “pause” to “reorganize the peace process with the guerrilla”.

“There has to exist a guarantee of seriousness and that the FARC accept, as a credibility gesture, to be concentrated in a place for a unilateral suspension of criminal activities”

(InicioElHeraldo.co, 2015). |}

productive sectors” said Alvaro Uribe in his speech after being elected as Senator (Uribe, 2014).
| Farc attacks (2) | June 8th, 2015: The guerilla intercepted 19 tanker trucks near Puerto Asis in the department of Putumayo. They forced the trucks to empty 204,275 barrels of crude oil on the road. | “We are suffering the consequences of five years of deteriorating security, and there is where the economy and social policy are going” said Alvaro Uribe criticizing Juan Manuel Santos government (Costa Noticias, 2015). |
| Conceptual relevance: |  | “Uribe said that today, the FARC entertain the country speaking of truces, but what is showing is that the loss of security has led the security of Colombians to have no guarantee from the government, since there is no security policy and otherwise the terrorism relieves by some moments and in other it worsens” (Costa Noticias, 2015). |
| Juan Manuel Santos said: “In Havana we are negotiating to end the conflict, we are there making peace and I want to take this opportunity to tell these gentlemen of the FARC, that it is not the way to show Colombians that you want peace, through attacks as the one of yesterday” (El Espectador, 2015) |